OIDC / OAuth 2.0 PKCE

No passwords are stored in the platform database. Authentication uses OpenID Connect with PKCE. The backend validates the RS256 JWT against the IdP's JWKS endpoint — the JWKS is cached per-issuer with configurable TTL. Multiple IdPs (Okta, Azure AD, Auth0, Ping) can be registered via POST /api/v1/idp/configs and the login page automatically renders one SSO button per active config.

Personal Access Tokens

For CI/CD, scripts, and SDK usage. Tokens are stored as hashed values — the plaintext is only shown once at creation time.

bash

Issue a PAT

curl -X POST /api/v1/auth/tokens \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $OIDC_JWT" \
  -d '{ "name": "CI pipeline", "expires_in_days": 90 }'
# Returns { "token": "sk-sovereign-..." } — store immediately

SCIM 2.0 Provisioning

Automated user and group provisioning from your IdP's SCIM connector (RFC 7644). SCIM DELETE is a soft-delete — users are set to status=revoked to preserve audit log foreign key integrity.

Endpoint	Description
`GET /api/scim/v2/Users`	List users (filterable)
`POST /api/scim/v2/Users`	Provision a new user
`PUT /api/scim/v2/Users/{id}`	Full replace
`PATCH /api/scim/v2/Users/{id}`	Partial update
`DELETE /api/scim/v2/Users/{id}`	Soft-delete (status → revoked)
`GET /api/scim/v2/Groups`	List workspaces as SCIM groups

Role-Based Access Control

Roles are embedded in JWT claims. Multiple roles per user are supported — passing multiple roles means "any of these roles is sufficient".

Role	Permissions
`admin`	All operations — user management, key rotation, IdP config
`ops`	Deploy models, approve HITL, manage clusters, configure IP allowlist
`legal`	Approve/reject GitOps manifests and HITL requests, view compliance reports
`dev`	Create/read models, run agents, view audit log

IP Allowlist

Per-workspace CIDR-based access control. Fail-closed: if enabled but empty, all requests are blocked. Health, SCIM, and API docs paths bypass the allowlist. Set TRUST_PROXY=true to derive real IP from X-Forwarded-For behind a load balancer.

bash

Configure allowlist

1# Enable policy
2curl -X PUT /api/v1/workspaces/{id}/ip-policy -d '{ "enabled": true }'
3
4# Add CIDR
5curl -X POST /api/v1/workspaces/{id}/ip-allowlist \
6  -d '{ "cidr": "10.0.0.0/8", "description": "Corporate VPN" }'

Encryption & Key Rotation

Sensitive configuration values (API keys, tool auth configs) are encrypted using Fernet (AES-128-CBC + HMAC-SHA256). The key is resolved at runtime from env, vault, aws_kms, or azure_keyvault. Key rotation: set SECRET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_PREV to the old key, call POST /api/v1/admin/rotate-keys to invalidate the in-process cache, run the re-encryption migration, then remove the _PREV variable.

Cryptographic Audit Chain

Every state-changing operation writes an AuditEntry with SHA-256 hash chaining. Each entry records previous_hash, creating a tamper-evident chain. The audit log has no DELETE or UPDATE endpoint — PostgreSQL row-level security additionally prevents the application role from deleting audit rows.

bash

Verify audit chain

curl -X POST /api/v1/audit/verify/{entry_id} \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns { "valid": true, "chain_length": 847, "genesis_reached": true }